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Chapter Twelve 
 
A Science of Context: 
The Qualitative Approach as Fundamental to Strategic Thought 
 
Matthew J. Schmidt, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, School of Advanced Military Studies 
 
Introduction 
 
Much of the reason the Army struggles with true strategic thinking and views such thinkers as 
outsiders in its ranks is because the prerequisites to strategic thinking are antithetical to the 
Army’s dominant professional culture. That culture privileges a techno-scientific 
quantitative/predictive worldview. Yet strategic thinking requires a fundamentally different 
worldview, one that is oriented around a qualitative way of thinking about problems. 
 
More specifically, strategic thinking involves the evaluation of “political, economic, 
psychological and military forces,” to reach a state of national advantage (Luttwak, 1987, pg. 
239-41; q.i. Heuser, 2010, p. 9). The disciplines that define strategic thought, political science, 
economics, psychology, and military science all require grounding more in qualitative social 
science methodology than the quantitative.  
 
This paper argues that, despite this, military culture continues to conflate strategic thought with a 
flawed, quantitative/predictive model of the social sciences. The result is that when this 
inherently impossible predictive standard fails to be met, rather than question the basis of the 
model, strategic thinking that is self-critical about the military’s approach is in turn suppressed. 
Thus a pseudo-scientific understanding of how qualitative research and analysis is done in turn 
perpetuates a model of pseudo-strategic thought. The challenge is to understand the basis of the 
quantitative/predictive versus qualitative/descriptive models of social science, their relationship 
to true strategic thought, and the organizational routines of the profession that hamper the 
establishment of a culture that recognizes and promotes such thought.  
 
Contemporary social science over the past century has come to understand social phenomena as 
comprising not independent and dependent variables, but interdependent ones. This is arguably 
the most crucial “discovery” of the social sciences. But it creates an irreducible tension for users 
of social science work who want predictability akin to the natural sciences. Interdependent 
variables disallow such possibilities because their very interdependence makes establishing a 
clear cause and effect relationship impossible.  
 
Quantitative v. Qualitative 
 
There is a large literature on the development of and use of qualitative and quantitative methods 
in European intellectual history. In a sense this debate goes back to the (overstated) difference in 
method between Plato and Aristotle. For the purposes of this argument, though, the relevant 
question is to clarify what is meant by each. Quantitative methods rely on mathematical and 
statistical approaches. They are variable-oriented and mirror the methodological approach of the 
“hard” sciences. Since these same statistical and mathematical models are the sine qua non of 
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fields like physics, chemistry, and biology; the empirical advances of the sub-fields associated 
with them (e.g. aerospace engineering, petro-chemistry, or pharmacology) are assumed to apply 
to any discipline using the same statistical and mathematical modeling approach. The standard 
narrative explains the advancement of science as a direct result of the application of the basic 
quantitative method every school child knows: observe, report, hypothesize, test, repeat 
(Feyerabend, 2001). “Real” science is understood as having only one method, “the” scientific 
method, and it is based on the quantitative mode of knowing. 
 
Qualitative methods employ a wholly different way of examining a problem. More importantly, 
they are a way of exploring a wholly different kind of problem. Or, to be absolutely clear, 
strategic questions are themselves never about “problems”, they are always about the same set of 
meta-problems. This is often easier to get at by looking first at what a meta-problem is not.  
 
Problems in the normal sense of the word involve the quantitative mode of thinking. Even 
extremely difficult problems are like this. “How do we invade Japan?” is an example. The basic 
process is quantitative/predictive according to the standard narrative of “the” scientific method. 
It starts with a defined highest-order problem (invading Japan) and breaks it down into smaller 
problems (How do we get there? How long would a trip by boat or plane take? How many 
weapons and supplies will we need? What kind?) and uses a reductive approach along with the 
analytical tools of mathematics and statistics in a repeating process until a series of answers can 
be summed together to solve the original problem presented.  
 
By contrast, qualitative questions are of a wholly different type. Further, qualitative questions 
are functionally the same as strategic questions. Rather than ask “How do we invade Japan?” a 
qualitative/strategic question broaches, if only for the sake of discussion, the question of if Japan 
should be invaded. In this way, a qualitative/strategic orientation asks first-order questions, 
(Should we invade Japan? What would doing so achieve? Are there other alternatives to invasion 
(e.g., bombing alone)? Should we seek the dissolution of the Imperial Institution?).1 These are 
not the type of questions any hierarchical organization naturally encourages be asked down the 
line. But they are fundamental for generating good planning because they probe the basic issue 
of strategic aim: What change in the military and political context a series of military operations 
ultimately intends to achieve. Put another way, strategic questions ask the same basic meta-
question: What is the change in qualitative condition (e.g., destruction of Japanese war-making 
capability to include or not the death or abdication of the Emperor) war plans intend to achieve? 
 
Further, the nature of qualitative evidence is different. All qualitative methods can be understood 
as having two facets. First, the basic skill of qualitative research is to accurately interpret text. To 
interpret text means to accurately understand its meaning or meanings. Any subsequent 
categorization of text a researcher may do in order to allow for statistical analysis requires that 
the text be interpreted first.2  The difficulty of interpreting what is meant by a subject in an 
                                                          
1 Thanks to my student, MAJ Eric Fowler, for giving me this suggestion. He offers a brilliant discussion of exactly 
this kind of qualitative/strategic thinking in his manuscript: “Will-to-Fight: Japan’s Imperial Institution and U.S. 
Strategy at the End of WWII,” unpublished, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, 2012. 
 
2 Although most of the time ‘text’ means ‘words’ spoken or written, I use ‘text’ in its broadest, linguistic, sense to 
mean any symbols needing to be interpreted before they can be categorized for analysis as in the examples of 
archival research, art history, or opinion surveys. 
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interview or what an archived memo meant in context is what requires extensive training in 
languages and cultures (to include the oft overlooked question of organizational cultures). A 
long-standing joke in the discipline is that while it may take only five years to make a physicist, 
it takes 20 to make a social scientist! There is at least some truth in this. Second, the basic form 
of all qualitative research is the gathering or developing of text. Qualitative research either 
gathers existing text from archives, memoirs, etc., or generates text through interviews or a 
derivative method like a focus-group or survey (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2004).  
 
The significance of this for military decision-makers was recently made clear in a remarkable 
speech by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey. Discussing his 
experience of how strategic decision-making occurs, Dempsey said, “When I go into a meeting 
to discuss policy, discuss strategy, discuss operations, plans, whatever it happens to be, he who 
has the best context generally prevails in the argument, not necessarily who’s got the best 
facts. There’s a difference. It’s who has the best context in which those facts exist,” (Dempsey, 
2010). Such context is what differentiates a qualitative from quantitative way of seeing the 
world. 
 
Technoscientific Warfare and Quantitative Approaches 
 
The modern American military tradition is techno-scientific to the extreme. In practice this 
means that the American tradition is chiefly defined by its “systemic application of science and 
technology,” as a way to gain “complete predictability and centralized control over armed 
conflict . . . .” (Bousquet, 2009, p. 33). In the Army this pattern became particularly exaggerated 
after the Vietnam War. General William DePuy, founder of the Army’s Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC), sought to refocus the new all-volunteer force toward what he saw as a 
future war dominated by technologically-skilled teams operating advanced weapons-systems as 
efficiently as they would a lawn mower (Mullen &  Brownlee, 1986). The debate over the 
“Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) of the 1990s trod similar ground.3 
 
The implication of this institutional commitment to the predictability model of the hard sciences 
is that it naturally privileges the quantitative way of knowing. In a similar way Depuy sought 
tactical superiority through systematized training in order to develop generalized, quasi-scientific 
rules and methods for battle. These rules and methods would maximize the chance of success in 
any engagement by minimizing moments where forces risk not having control of the situation. 
This last part is also akin to the kind of experimental control possible in most hard science 
laboratories. In effect, this reduces tactical engagements down to highly predictable events where 
the basic variable is the execution of tactical principles and the performance of weapons, both of 
which can be reasonably well controlled for. Crucially, the validity of the principles themselves 
are taken as proven.  
 
American forces, especially since Vietnam, have repeatedly been in tactical engagements that 
can be seen as having been overwhelmingly successful. This overwhelming tactical success is 
the reason why questions about tactical principles need not be asked. These engagements have 
used and proven the systemic and systematic application of position, cover, fires, 
                                                          
3 For an overview of the RMA debate I recommend Tim Benbow, The Magic Bullet?: Understanding the Revolution 
in Military Affairs (London: Brassey's, 2004). 
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communication, etc., with the result that this success has created a quasi-scientific discipline. 
More importantly, the sum of all this experience is to reinforce the quantitative approach that has 
been fundamental in producing such tactical success.  
 
The reason this is not possible in the social sciences is that the fundamental questions of the field 
involve humans. As Steven Weinberg, a winner of the Nobel Prize in physics, noted, “It has been 
an essential element in the success of science to distinguish those problems that are and are not 
illuminated by taking human beings into account,” (Weinberg, 2001; q.i. Flyvbjerg, 2005). The 
problems of war and warfare clearly fall into the category of problems where it is necessary to 
take human beings into account.  
 
The central question in all social science is to explain why people do things. For students of war 
and warfare it’s why they start wars, end wars, and prosecute them in certain ways at certain 
times, and not at others. Answering any of these questions involves getting at the subjective 
motivations of kings, generals, soldiers, and civilians. The ways in which this gets done is, 
broadly speaking, the qualitative/descriptive method. In plain terms, it is the problem of creating 
a kind of objective science of subjective phenomena. 
 
Separate from the problem of how to gather and interpret data about human intentions and 
motivations is the problem of time. Social science questions fundamentally involve time as an 
interdependent variable. L. P. Hartley’s now aphoristic line, “The past is a foreign country,” is 
but one illustration of why time complicates cause and effect arguments (Hartley, 1953, p.1). It’s 
not that there are not causes and effects; it’s that explaining complex events like warfare in the 
kind of generalizable, out-of-time rules that are possible in the natural sciences is impossible. 
Answering why the Hundred Years War happened is not the same as explaining why Vietnam 
happened. Whatever the broad similarities, the cross-case differences are always greater. 
 
There is a set of possible causes, and a set of possible reasons why a certain combination of 
causes seemed to produce a given effect (the American war in Vietnam). But there are 
irreducible arguments about both the set range of possible causes and the set range of 
combinations. And the chief reason is that motivations for human behavior change over time. 
Unlike in physics where what was true about a feather dropped from the Tower of Pisa some half 
a millennia ago remains true today, in the world of social behavior what was true just yesterday 
is often not true today. Even in economics, the supposedly “hardest” of the “soft” sciences the 
inside joke is that economists are, “experts who will know tomorrow why the things they 
predicted yesterday did not happen today” (Flyvbjerg, 2005, p. 39).  
 
So at its simplest the reason strategic thought is so difficult to inculcate in the Army is that its 
lack of predictive power makes its value seem weak to commanders tasked to ‘do something’ 
and ‘do it now’. Like other large bureaucratic organizations the modern Army adopted 
quantitative methods to guide its expansion. Those methods reflected the larger dominance of the 
so-called rational-scientific approaches being adopted by industry and the hard sciences together. 
For a period this included the social sciences, as hopes abounded that a ‘behavioralist’ revolution 
was just around the corner. According to some proponents, such a revolution would make the 
social sciences, particularly political science, into ‘true’ sciences in the image of physics and 
chemistry. The key would be to amass a sufficient amount of data about human behavior and 
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develop sufficient computational abilities to make generalized rules, and the predictions that 
follow, possible (Eulau, 1969). But as work in these fields proceeded, most came to believe that 
such a goal was not only not possible, but that its impossibility defined the divide between the 
hard and soft sciences. 
 
To put this in contemporary terms, arguments about Afghanistan in 2008 led to a decision by the 
White House to surge 30,000 troops into the country based on a loosely predictive model about 
the effect of a similar surge into Iraq in 2006. The methodological problem with this way of 
thinking is that it assumes cause and effect relationships on the basis of scant to zero evidence. 
As the Center for Strategic and International Studies diplomatically put it, the differences 
between each country are “considerable,” making the ostensible strategic aim of each surge 
“quite different” (Freier, 2009). 
 
Still a decision had to be made. But the problem of the time lag between assumed cause X (the 
Iraq surge) and assumed effect Y (success in Iraq) meant strategic-level decision-makers had to 
rely on little but a guess about cause and effect. And even if the time lag from X to Y is 
discounted, the internal variables grouped under the title “the surge” meant even more lack of 
clarity. What about the surge might have caused a drop in violence? The sheer amount of troops? 
The population density of the key neighborhoods? Or the thousand little different operational 
approaches individual commands took? These are the sets of variables and combinations that 
make the qualitative mode of thinking what it is. To get to any sort of defensible answer one 
probably has to be 10 years out from the present in order to identify the critical variables and 
have enough information to understand their relationships and interactions. But the decision has 
to be made today. Institutional frustration with a qualitative approach that can provide context 
but not prediction is understandable. 
 
Strategic Thought and the Qualitative Approach 
 
So what good does a non-predictive method do for a “must show results” world? Unlike the 
quantitative/predictive model of the social sciences, the qualitative/descriptive approach is 
concerned with two things: (1) describing the values and interests of social groups, and (2) 
ensuring that a discussion of the values and interests of legitimate social groups are represented 
in public decision-making processes. This is what Flyvbjerg describes as ensuring “due 
diligence” in the public realm (Flyvbjerg, 2005). 
 
Strategic thinking requires the kind of habit of mind that it is concerned with qualitative changes 
in complex military, social, and political environments. The kind of changes in values and 
interests that Flyvbjerg argues are at the core of the qualitative approach to science. Further, in 
this sense there is no static state called “victory” against which progress can be quantitatively 
measured. Rather, the strategic thinker must continually make a judgment about the qualitative 
changes he is charged with affecting (Dolman, 2005). Those changes, of course, reflect the 
values and interests of actors and institutions in the public realm. As both the actors and 
institutions change and/or the rank order of values and interests changes, the strategic proposition 
itself changes. “Victory” is a changeling mirroring the shifts in values and interests of those who 
have the power to define it. 
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Moreover, the nature of strategic thought requires thinking about systemic (interrelated) 
conditions over the course of time; a process for which quantitative measures are of only limited 
use. Most importantly, strategic thinking is less a discrete activity and more a habit of mind. 
Developing the habit of thinking strategically after matriculating through a professional culture 
(often rightly) focused on quantitative measures of tactical proficiency is extraordinarily 
difficult.4 Each method represents a different way of knowing about the world. The issue is not 
that one is better than the other. The quantitative approach supports strategic thought, but it 
cannot be sufficient to ignite or sustain it. Only the qualitative mindset can develop a 
strategically-focused habit of mind.  
 
Commanders frame questions as “problems” to be solved. This is the language of quantitative 
algebra. Strategic thinking asks about meta-problems, things like ‘is it worth invading Europe?’, 
“Is there an alternative (bombing Germany, letting the Soviets do it)?”, “What does doing so 
gain us?”, “For how long does this gain last?” and most importantly “How will having done so 
qualitatively change our situation?” Though quantitative methods can be used as indicators for 
whether or not an invasion is worth it, every measure of effectiveness requires a decision first be 
made about what the standard should be against which the program is measured. Does “worth” 
mean causalities, money or both? Does “worth” mean territorial gains or political? Could the 
action in question simply be a moral imperative and thus be outside the standard cost/benefit 
discourse? That is, even as the strategist uses quantitative methods he must be aware that they 
reflect a subjective perspective—his boss’s, his own, the enemy’s command, the enemy’s 
population, etc. The problem lies less in the measure than in understanding its context from the 
perspective of the key actors in the conflict. 
 
Every measure (quantitative or qualitative) has to be interpreted in context. By their nature 
qualitative measurements presuppose the kind of theoretical frameworks essential for strategic 
thought (a theory must exist to justify the measure). And though qualitative methods can 
certainly be used to generate quantitative-looking measures of effectiveness (MOEs), the process 
of, say, categorizing focus-group information into numerical scores requires an explicit causal 
framework as a basis for the categorization. And since there are many different contexts for 
causal frameworks (e.g., national culture, the professional cultures of the Army/Navy or civilian 
government, or the view from 10 Downing Street, London), no one answer is definitive. And 
again, time as a variable complicates the articulation of context. Except in the esoteric realms of 
cosmology or quantum physics, hard-science rules are rules precisely because they are valid 
predictors of outcome regardless of time. Strategic thinking is fundamentally about thinking in 
time. And thinking in time is about thinking in terms of the interrelated nature of variables 
across time—about context. For a time-pressured commander, knowing tomorrow whether the 
predictions made yesterday about the enemy’s standing today is generally useless. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 It is important to note the idea of matriculating upward through an organization. There are good reasons 
quantitative measures are privileged in the military. Being able to decisively and repeatedly hit a target with a bullet 
is a skill that is properly measured with quantitative measures. The issue is knowing what methods of evaluation are 
best for a each unique situation. As Soldiers ‘grow up’ in the Army the dominant evaluation method they are 
exposed to is quantitative. 
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Scientism and Defensive Routines 
 
Systemic misunderstanding in the larger Army of the differences between approaches has meant 
that the scientific validity of qualitative inquiry is deeply discounted. What remains is a scient-
istic, not scientific, view of the role qualitative/strategic thinking can play in military decision-
making. To the extent that this view permeates U.S. command culture, it undermines real 
strategic thought by privileging the false objectivity of quantitative measures. This is not a 
unique problem to the military or the Army. Decades of work in organization theory have 
established that formal institutions engage in what are called “organizational defensive routines” 
(Argyris, 1990). The substitution of a scientistic standard in place of the complicated challenges 
of doing good qualitative science reflects exactly this kind of defensive routine. 
 
Organizational defensive routines have chilling effects on institutional adaptation and learning 
because they tend to defend existing modes of thought and causal frameworks in light of 
radically changed operational or strategic contexts. Defensive routines are what discourage true 
strategic thought. Defensive routines derive from natural personal aversion to threat and 
embarrassment. In essence, defensive routines reflect the natural human aversion to admitting to 
doubt or outright error, something at the heart of the strategic mode of thinking.  
 
At the organizational level such embedded routines entail four basic elements: the crafting of 
inconsistent, ambiguous messages; actions by organizational leadership that signal such 
messages do not contain inconsistencies or ambiguities; actions by organizational leadership that 
makes discussion of any inconsistencies or ambiguities undiscussable; and actions by 
organizational leadership that make the undiscussability of the undiscussability itself 
undiscussable (Argyis, 1990).  
 
Army commanders’ institutional norms privilege a “can do” attitude backed by quantitative 
methods and a scientistic causal framework that butt up against the complexity of real conflicts 
where (1) political and/or military directions (strategic aims) are ambiguously phrased “establish 
a safe and secure environment,” in Ninewa, Iraq for example (FM 5-0, p.3-3), (2) officers are left 
to respond to the ambiguity of such a mission statement on their own, through the establishment 
of their own standards and MOEs for determining what “safe and secure” means, (3) discussion 
of the ambiguity in the mission statement are met with hostile or simply indifferent attitudes (the 
delayed discussion until the publication of FM 5-0) and (4) the problem of not being able to 
discuss that attempts to discuss the ambiguity of the mission were met with hostile or indifferent 
attitudes. All this only serves to further isolate commanders. This often leads to a reversion into 
known operational approaches because they are comfortable, not necessarily because they are 
appropriate to the now qualitatively-changed environment. In less abstracted terms, this is the 
kind of institutional problem FM 5-0 calls out. 
 
This is particularly problematic in times of transition, whether in terms of an operational 
environment as described above, or in terms of more grand-strategic shifts. Transitional periods 
are transitional because the variables and trends that were relatively stable in the previous era 
have begun to shift. Geostrategically, the end of the Cold War represented a shift in the stability 
of what American policy-makers understood as the chief threat. The Soviet variable disappeared, 
in effect changing the whole calculus of the security problem(s) facing the U.S. But what the 
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new calculus was could not yet be seen in any detail. The U.S. security establishment, having co-
evolved with a particular military-political ecosystem in the Cold War now faced catastrophic 
success (Forging a New Shield, 2008). In methodological terms, the security equation had 
qualitatively shifted. That much was clear. But the key variables and trends that analysts had 
previously used to help make sense of the security ecosystem had also changed. And before any 
straight-up analysis of the meaning of the transition out of the Cold War could take place the 
methodological problem of determining new variables and identifying trends had to be 
addressed. The geopolitical and military ecosystem had fundamentally (qualitatively and 
strategically) changed. In what way and, most importantly, with what meaning for the U.S. was 
unclear and continued to be so until a new methodological framework for the new order was 
established.  
 
Admitting to being in such situations is extraordinarily difficult. The pressure to offer instant 
prognostication can be immense. And few commanders or political leaders want to be seen as 
“indecisive”. Yet in a real sense strategic thinking requires at least the mindset of someone who 
is perpetually unsure about what and why something might happen if one decision is made over 
another.  
 
If politics and warfare were a hard science this would mean there was no reliable quantitative 
basis for military decisions, strategic or tactical. But politics and warfare are not hard sciences. 
One need only think about the qualitative questions surrounding Afghanistan to find another, 
more current example. 
 
The reality of such transitional periods is that people, and the formal and informal institutions 
they aggregate into, project “data” into assumed “equations” about how the world works. These 
are the generalized causal theories about international relations and politics that people hold 
(Stone, 1989). In other words, they are the values that one group of people assumes operate to 
guide the behavior of another. The key is to recognize that such projections are just that, 
projections.  
 
This kind of reflexive awareness is where a proper understanding of social science and the 
qualitative approach is central. Remember, the qualitative approach has two meanings. In its first 
sense the qualitative is different from the quantitative because it asks “framing” questions. The 
holistic “why” and “what does it mean” questions intended to answer big questions like, “How 
has the security ecosystem changed with the collapse of the USSR?” or “What will a pull-out of 
U.S. forces from Afghanistan mean to the incumbent government?” In its second sense it differs 
because the actual data-gathering methods cannot escape the “problem” of subjective 
interpretation. As discussed above, any textual data gathered or generated requires a human 
researcher to subjectively categorize it. 
 
A Science of Context 
 
Viewing interpretation as a “problem”, however, misses the whole point of strategic/qualitative 
thinking. Exploring the contextual change such a large qualitative shift would have on 
Afghanistan is precisely the kind of question qualitative approaches are meant to answer. A de-
contextualized version of this question might be something like, “What will a U.S. drawdown of 
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forces in Afghanistan mean?” But the real question is to ask a version of this that puts the 
question in the context of the key people (agents) we are interested in. What will a drawdown 
mean to the Karzai government? What does Karzai himself think about this? Literally, what 
words does he use to describe his feelings about this eventuality? Does he describe a drawdown 
in language that indicates he fears for just his job, or his life? Or does he use language that 
indicates he sees a drawdown as an opportunity to consolidate or expand his power? In other 
words, what does the objective description of Karzai’s subjective response tell us? Surely he 
understands his own context better than we can. The goal of qualitative work is to establish a 
collected and collated description of these kinds of subjective experience, of one man, of select 
branches in the government, or swaths of the population. Categorizing opinion surveys, 
interviews, speeches, economic data, etc. is the only way to construct a picture of the strategic 
implications of a pull-out. The point of the exercise is to go through the process of categorization 
in order to first get a sense of the range of possible qualitative futures, second to examine what 
policy orientation would leave the U.S. in the best position under whichever of the futures comes 
to be, and only lastly to try to rank order the probability of a given future. To return to General 
Dempsey, the facts mean little without context. 
 
Avoiding qualitative approaches because they can’t predict in the same way natural science can 
misstates the purpose of qualitative work. The qualitative approach is the science of putting facts 
into context. That this requires subjective choices on the part of qualitative or strategic thinkers is 
not a weakness. The success of a qualitative approach is not in its predictive capability, but in the 
questions it raises for decision-makers to consider. Strategic thinking is the art of thinking 
through questions of context—the “What does Karzai think” or “What’s the view from different 
groups in the Ministry of Defense” inquiries. These are the questions that matter. Alone, the 
number of humvees in the Afghan National Army (ANA) or even the number of soldiers who 
passed basic training don’t tell us much about what we really want to know (is the ANA of high 
enough quality—in many different senses of the word—to do its job effectively?). Ultimately 
what we want to know is why people behave a certain way, and why people behave a certain 
way is a product of what they think, what they feel. Knowing why they think and feel that way is 
the only way to have any hope of changing their behavior. Numbers can be indicators of how 
many people feel or think a certain way, but they can’t answer why. Strategic thinking is about 
those “why” questions and a qualitative approach is the only means science has for answering 
them.  
 
The challenge is twofold. First, the Army needs to openly embrace the subjectivity of the 
qualitative approach strategic thinking requires, in full awareness of one’s cognitive and 
institutional biases. Second, it needs to invest much more time into training commanders and 
their staffs in how to evaluate qualitative work, even if they don’t produce it themselves. But 
dismissing qualitative approaches on the basis of a flawed conception of what science is allows 
misconception and cognitive bias to undermine the Army’s capacity for true strategic thinking. 
In an era of conflict defined by a unique interweaving of military and socio-political complexity, 
to ignore the scientific approach designed to specifically address questions of human context 
would be the worst kind of strategic mistake. 
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